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The increasing importance of Corporate social responsibility to entrepreneurial policies has made it a
leading topic in the literature. The strategic integration of Corporate social responsibility in the business
core implies the communication between a company and its stakeholders. Sustainability reports are
recognized worldwide as a tool that companies use to communicate their socially responsible behavior.
The way companies communicate through their reports indicates their level of commitment to Corporate
social responsibility. The objective of this paper is to analyze companies' behavior towards Corporate
social responsibility based on their disclosure practices. We deﬁne four possible types of behavior:
Novice, Cautious, Chattering and Leading. These types are the result of the combination of two variables
that measure the disclosure and credibility of Corporate social responsibility information. Our results
indicate that companies listed in the stock market disclose more Corporate social responsibility information than private ones but with less credibility. European countries are leading the rankings in
Corporate social responsibility information and tend to have a Cautious or Leading attitude. Finally, we
report differences among industries.
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The increasing importance of Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR) to entrepreneurial policies has made it a leading topic in the
literature (Mair and Martí, 2006; Marshall, 2011; Short et al., 2008).
The strategic integration of CSR in the business core, as defended by
Ballou et al. (2012), implies the communication between a company and its stakeholders. Although many means of communication are possible, sustainability reports (SR) are the tool most used
by companies to present their economic, environmental and social
impact. The levels of SR disclosure and its credibility are linked to
the reasons underlying the CSR policies adopted. Graaﬂand and
Smid (2004) argue that greater communication about social
behavior is necessary to improve companies' reputation, and they
state the importance of governmental initiatives to promote CSR
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attitudes. Nielsen and Thomsen (2007) afﬁrm that, from a managerial perspective, non-ﬁnancial reporting looks for transparency in
social behavior when communicating corporate activities with
social and environmental effects. Cornelissen (2004) posits that a
ﬁrm's future depends on how the key stakeholders perceive the
ﬁrm's behavior. Thus, SR can be considered as the public expression
of socially responsible behavior. Communicating CSR attitudes is
inexorably linked to the existence of a responsible behavior or, at
least, to having some social responsibility facts to communicate.
Actually, SR is a way to connect with stakeholders, to show what
and how companies are doing, and even to be a positive example to
others (European Commission, 2005).
Even though no full agreement was reached in terms of format,
the discussion on CSR resulted in a worldwide recognition of SR as
the basic tool for its communication and the recognition of the need
to develop standards to increase its quality. In fact, Joseph (2012)
highlights the importance of having sustainability that is wellgrounded in rules and principles, which contributes to standardization. O'Connor and Spangenberg (2008) emphasize the need to
model CSR reporting and develop a proposal based on stakeholders'
dialog. Dubbink et al. (2008) identify procedural standards for
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measuring transparency in social reports. Dando and Swift (2003)
note the importance of developing standards to fulﬁll the need
for transparent and trustworthy information, coinciding with
Christensen (2002).
Up to date, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is widely
recognized as the most trustworthy framework for disclosing sustainable information (Brown et al., 2009; Kaye, 2011; KPMG, 2011),
Manetti and Becatti, 2009; Nikolaeva and Bicho, 2011). GRI has
developed the leading standard or guidelines for CSR reporting
(KPMG, 2008). The guidelines require disclosures in the following
categories: economic, environmental, social performance/labor
practices, social performance/human rights, social performance/
society and social performance/product responsibility. The ﬁrst set
of guidelines, G1, was released in 2000, with 44 companies presenting the reports. G2, the second set of guidelines, was issued in
2002. In 2006, the G3 set of guidelines was released. G3 was
developed with the participation of more than 3000 experts, who
had a multi-stakeholder and multidisciplinary approach. It provides a universal set of rules for reporting sustainability performance. G3.1 was released on March 2011 as an advance of the
expected changes for G4, which was being developed at the same
time. It increases reporting in terms of gender, community and
human rights. Finally, in 2013, a new set of guidelines, G4, was
released. Among other features, G4 enhances the disclosures on
governance, ethics and integrity, the supply chain, anti-corruption
and GHG emissions. Although there is no requirement, a large
number of companies have the reports attested by an independent
party, which is an independent professional service that reduces
the information risk. If companies choose to do so, the assurance
providers must prepare an assurance statement (AS) with their
opinions about the disclosed information. The use of GRI guidelines
is continually growing (Roca and Searcy, 2012).
On the other hand, socially responsible behavior is recognized as
an attitude that results from internal and external pressure on
companies, which is linked to corporate image and reputation.
Some companies use opportunistic tactics to improve the image of
the ﬁrm (Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2008) or to win public acceptance
and legitimacy, although their day-to-day activities show dubious
practices (Jahdi and Acikdilli, 2009). This type of attitude questions
managers' ethical behavior and social responsibility (Fray, 2007).
The increase in positive consumer image motivated by the adoption
of social responsibility practices is also reported in different marketing studies (e.g., Battacharya and Sen, 2004; Becker et al., 2006;
Klein and Dawar, 2004; Mohr et al., 2001; Sen et al., 2006; Sen and
Battacharya, 2001). Although sustainability reporting guidelines
continue to follow a compartmental perspective (Lozano, 2013),
reporting practices in CSR are considered as a proxy for sustainability behavior (Bassu and Palazzo, 2005; Galbreath, 2010; Nielsen
and Thomsen, 2007). Complete or incomplete, balanced or unbalanced, SR shows off what a company is doing in terms of CSR
(European Commission, 2005). Hence, the levels of SR disclosure
and its credibility are linked to CSR behavior. To analyze the performance of the CSR of a ﬁrm, SR is essential.
In sum, CSR reports are the tool extensively used to communicate
companies' social behavior. Although managers' motivation for this
attitude is not disclosed, we believe that this motivation is conveyed
in the way companies communicate through their reports. Thus, the
objective of this paper is to analyze companies' behavior towards CSR
based on their disclosure practices to assess their level of commitment. We classify the ﬁrms considering their ownership structure,
size, country and industry. The results of this study provide a deﬁnition of the characteristics of companies with a truthful proﬁle towards CSR. Therefore, this study may be useful to different users of
sustainability reports (e.g., investors, customers and regulators) to
understand the managers' real commitment to CSR reporting.
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The paper continues with a discussion on socially responsible
behavior, proposing a four-group classiﬁcation followed by a literature review focused on the variables used in the paper. The subsequent chapters include the research methodology and the results,
ending with the conclusions and the limitations of our study.
2. Socially responsible behavior of companies: hypotheses
development
Organizations all over the world recognize the need for socially
responsible behavior. In fact, sustainable business behavior and
business activity should reﬂect the ethical conception of a ﬁrm
(Svensson et al., 2010). The ISO 26000 standard outlines seven
principles of socially responsible behavior: accountability, transparency, ethical behavior, respect for stakeholder interests, fulﬁllment of the rule of law, respect for international norms of behavior,
and respect for human rights. This concept can be approached from
the point of view of companies as well as from the point of view of
stakeholders, with consumers representing one of the groups most
often discussed in literature.
McWilliams and Siegel (2001) outline a supply and demand
model of CSR. They conclude that there exists an ideal level of CSR,
which is based on a cost-beneﬁt analysis. The authors discuss
different determinants of consumer demand for CSR, which include
the prices of the goods and the role of CSR as a differentiation tool,
advertising, consumer income, consumer taste, demographics and
the price of substitutes. From the supply perspective, Campbell
(2007) presents eight propositions to explain why companies
behave in a socially responsible way. The ﬁrst two propositions
state that companies will be less likely to act in a socially responsible way under bad economic conditions (1) or if there is either too
much or too little competition (2). Propositions three to eight state
that ﬁrms will be more likely to act in a socially responsible way in
the presence of the following factors: legal regulation (3); industrial
self-regulation (4); external pressure from stakeholders (5); a link
between managers and educational institutions that promote
responsible behavior (6); if the ﬁrm belongs to associations that
promote this type of behavior (7); and if the ﬁrm is involved in
institutionalized dialogue with stakeholders (8). Similarly, Haigh
and Jones (2006) establish four sources of pressure to explain
companies' social behavior: internal and competitive pressure,
external pressure from investors and consumers, regulatory pressure and pressure from popular mobilization. Frias-Aceituno et al.
(2013) highlight that the relevant behavior should be carefully
documented in the companies' annual reports.
Graaﬂand and Smid (2004) analyze the role of government and
self-regulatory reputation mechanisms in socially responsible
behavior. They ﬁnd that CSR policies aim to build reputation and
that this effect is more important for large companies than for
smaller ones. Hence, from this point of view, CSR does not involve
a real managerial commitment but a marketing strategy by offering an artiﬁcial positive image of the ﬁrm. Williamson et al.
(2006) identify three values and attitudes underpinning
behavior: cost savings and responding to cost pressures,
responding to the supply chain, and responding to regulation.
They conclude that small- and medium-sized enterprises will
adopt socially responsible behavior forced by the aforementioned
values and attitudes, and not voluntarily. Using a sample of
ndez-Gago (2011) study
Spanish companies, Godos-Díez and Ferna
how socially responsible management is perceived by top managers. They ﬁnd two groups of managers: those who give importance to CSR itself and those that value CSR because of its
contribution to the companies' productivity. They also ﬁnd an
inﬂuence of size, industry, the age of the company and ﬁnancial
performance, among others.
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It can be concluded that there are external factors that affect
companies' socially responsible behavior. The literature recognizes
stakeholders' pressure and shareholders' expectations as drivers of
demanding a more social attitude from companies. Both drivers
have a very different conceptual origin. The ﬁrst one, stakeholder
pressure, values CSR and socially responsible behavior on its own,
while shareholder expectation values them for the economic performance effect they have. The ﬁnal result is that both drivers have
a positive effect on socially responsible behavior.
The literature also highlights different managerial attitudes towards CSR, which depend on managerial strategies. Freeman
(1984) posits that to establish the foundation of enterprise-level
strategy, different factors such as stakeholders, values and societal issues have to be analyzed. He indicates that the distinguishing
feature of CSR is that it applies “the stakeholder concept to nontraditional stakeholder groups usually thought as having an
adversarial relationship with the ﬁrm,” and that “less emphasis is
put on satisfying owners and comparatively more emphasis is put
on the public or the community or the employees” (p.38).
Basu and Palazzo (2005) identify four types of CSR practices. The
ﬁrst one, “Robber Barons,” groups ﬁrms that seek to increase their
wealth at any cost and regard local laws as their limits. They ignore
ethical aspects, especially in international activity. “Robin Hoods,”
the second group, are linked to philanthropy and a sense of moral
duty. Executives in this group exclude CSR from their business
strategy, and “They make a strict distinction between making a
proﬁt and using the proﬁt” (p.2). “Book-keepers” have a strategic
approach to CSR. They understand the impacts of stakeholders' actions, and use CSR as a tool to manage their risks. The last group,
“Statesmen,” includes real believers and appliers of CSR, understanding the link between economic and social objectives. The authors conclude that the impacts of this typology of CSR behavior on
ideology, legitimacy, language and leadership are features linked to
CSR. These authors also identify differences in the language used to
communicate CSR depending on the type of CSR behavior. Nielsen
and Thomsen (2007) ﬁnd that annual reports are dissimilar and
that companies have different interests stemming from different
afﬁliations, such as governments and NGOs. Galbreath (2010) conducts a survey among CEOs to explore differences in CSR reporting.
He ﬁnds differences between the strategy types of managers.
Prospectors and defenders presented higher levels of disclosure
than analyzers, while reactors demonstrated the lowest levels.
KPMG (2011) analyzes the quality of communications and the level
of process maturity, using these two elements as grouping criteria,
deﬁning four categories. The ﬁrst one, ‘Leading the pack’, groups
mature companies with high quality in their CSR communication.
The second group is ‘Starting behind’ and is made up of companies
characterized by a limited quality of communications and narrow
growing maturity perspective. ‘Getting it right’ is the third group. It
is described as groping companies that take a conservative avenue
to becoming leading-the-pack members. The last group, ‘Scratching
the surface’, groups companies that are more worried about
communication but less concerned about their level of CSR maturity.
Based on the literature reviewed, our proposal identiﬁes four
types of behavior according to the companies' reporting characteristics. These four behaviors are built on both quantitative
(disclosure) and qualitative (credibility) characteristics of CSR
reporting. They are related to transparency (Fernandez-Feijoo et al.,
2014). Novice behavior includes companies with low commitment
to CSR reporting. These companies disclose the minimum amount
of information and do not provide assurance with the report,
reducing its credibility. Cautious behavior includes companies that
do not disclose in depth, but that show a commitment to CSR by
including credibility tools. It may include companies that are
implementing CSR strategies. Chattering behavior includes

companies that use SR as a marketing strategy. They disclose a high
amount of information, but they do not add elements that would be
used to evaluate its quality or credibility. Finally, Leading behavior
includes companies with high levels of disclosure and credibility.
Given that the objective of this paper is to identify the links
between companies' proﬁle and commitment to CSR, we propose
four hypotheses. The hypotheses take into consideration the ﬁrms'
characteristics identiﬁed in literature as affecting CSR disclosure;
namely, ownership, size, country and industry.
Nielsen and Thomsen (2007) argue that the company's behavior
in terms of CSR reporting depends on the expectation of their
stakeholders. Regarding the ownership structure, investors are a
signiﬁcant interested party.
Stock market-listed and -non-listed companies differ in the
liquidity of their investors and the control relationships between
owners and managers (Boot et al., 2006). Fama and Jensen (1983)
state that in companies with broadly held ownership, the potential principal and agent conﬂict is greater than in closely held
companies. As a result, information disclosure will be greater in the
ﬁrst group to help monitoring.
In agreement with this theory, previous research found listed
companies to have higher levels of disclosure (e.g., Eng and Mak,
2003; Meek et al., 1995; Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Chau and Gray,
2002). Eng and Mak (2003) ﬁnd that the structure of ownership
determines the level of monitoring, and hence, the level of disclosure. They posit that when managerial ownership is low, there is an
increased need for monitoring. They also relate this effect to
diffused ownership (less than 5%). These two characteristics, low
levels of managerial ownership and diffused ownership, are associated with listed companies. The authors ﬁnd lower managerial
ownership associated with increased voluntary disclosure, and no
effect of diffused ownership.
Assurance of SR, on the other hand, is not mandatory. Previous
research, which almost exclusively involves companies listed in the
stock market, recognizes a lack of precision in the external veriﬁcation of SR (Gillet, 2012).
Based on the existing literature and the principaleagent relationship, we expect listed companies to have higher levels of
disclosure than non-listed ones. With regards to assurance, given
that AS is not considered an appropriate tool to add credibility or
help with the principal-agent relationship, we expect to ﬁnd no
difference between listed and non-listed companies. Thus, our ﬁrst
hypothesis is stated as follows:
H1. Companies listed in the stock market are more likely to have a
Chattering or a Leading behavior, while non-listed companies are
more likely to have a Novice or Cautious behavior.
Company size, similar to ownership structure, is linked to the
level of pressure from stakeholders (Agudo Valiente et al., 2012).
Large companies have more viewers, meaning that they are more
controlled, and their behavior is constantly analyzed. To manage
the risk of their great visibility, large companies are more likely to
disclose higher levels of CSR information (Chen and Bouvain, 2009;
Simnett et al., 2009). Of the companies with revenues of more than
US$50 billion, 92% present SR, while 48% of the companies with
revenues under US$1 billion report their CR activities (KPMG,
2011). It is also expected that large companies will report more
CSR information because they have more available resources
(Perrini et al., 2007).
Simnett et al. (2009) ﬁnd that large companies are more likely to
produce stand-alone SR and that large companies are signiﬁcantly
more likely to have their SR assured, compared to smaller companies. Similar results are found for Spain (Sierra et al., 2012);
Portugal (Monteiro and Aibar-Guzman, 2010; Branco and Rodrígues, 2008); Germany (Gamerschlag et al., 2011); the UK (Brammer
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and Pavelin, 2006) or Scandinavian countries (Cerin, 2002). On the
contrary, Kolk and Perego (2010) ﬁnd no correlation between
company size and the decision to have SR assured among Fortune
Global 250 (FG-250) companies. In terms of quality, Vormedal and
Ruud (2009) do not ﬁnd evidence of a relationship between size
and high scores used to measure the quality of the sustainability
disclosures in Norwegian companies.
Most of the reviewed research studies companies listed in the
stock market, which results in the comparison between large and
larger companies, rather than between small and large companies.
Holder-Webb et al. (2009) use a size-stratiﬁed sample of 50 US
listed companies and ﬁnd that frequency of disclosure is different
for the largest companies, but they do not ﬁnd any pattern of
behavior within the remainder of the sample. This evidence suggests that the effect of companies' size on the measure of disclosure
in terms of frequency and credibility remains to be evaluated.
Perrini et al. (2007) analyze the differences in CSR strategies between large and small and medium companies. Through interviews, they collect data from 3680 Italian companies and ﬁnd
that large companies are more likely to develop formal tools to
control and report CSR (ethical codes, social reports and SA8000).
The existing literature is inconclusive on the effect of real small
and large companies, but it is expected that different-sized companies will present different patterns of behavior in CSR reporting.
Although a small company analysis is not sufﬁciently developed in
literature, we expect that large companies are more likely to behave
as listed owned companies and small companies as non-listed
companies. Our second hypothesis is stated as follows:
H2. Large companies are more likely to have a Chattering or a
Leading behavior, while small companies are more likely to have a
Novice or a Cautious behavior.
Culture and traditions, legislation, and social and economic
context, among others, are elements that deﬁne the differences
among countries. These factors affect CSR attitudes and reporting
as well. The triennial surveys issued by KPMG International (2005,
2008, 2011) show signiﬁcant differences in the rate of CSR reporting
among countries as well as in the assurance of SR. Kolk (2008) ﬁnds
that 90% of the European companies in the FG-250 present some
type of SR and 83% of the Japanese companies present some type of
SR, while only 35% of US companies do. Kolk highlights the relevance of external veriﬁcation in European companies. The highest
score is for the UK, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain and Italy,
while German companies score lowest. Of Japanese companies,
24.3% present external veriﬁcation, and only 2.9% of the US companies have SR assured by a third party (Kolk, 2008). Hartman et al.
(2007) explore the differences in CSR reporting in the US and European Union. They select a sample of the 8 most selective communicators in both regions, and ﬁnd that companies in the UK
present more SR with third-party assurance than their counterparts
in the USA do. Van der Laan Smith et al. (2005) ﬁnd higher levels of
reporting in Scandinavian countries, considered stakeholderoriented countries, than in USA companies, considered a
shareholder-oriented country. Regarding the assurance of SR, Kolk
and Perego (2010) use a panel of companies with SR in 1999, 2002
and 2005 from the FG-250 in the USA, Japan, Germany, France and
the UK. Their result shows that companies located in stakeholderoriented countries are more likely to have their SR assured
compared with those in shareholder-oriented countries. The same
conclusion is presented by Simnett et al. (2009), who look at the
reports of 2113 companies from 31 countries and analyze the factors that determine the decision to assure the reports.
Hence, according to the existing literature, we expect that
different countries will present different patterns of behavior in
CSR reporting. Our third hypothesis is stated as follows:
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H3. There are differences in CSR reporting behavior associated
with different countries.
Industry is a variable used to analyze the differences in content
and the extent of CSR reporting. The literature on this topic is
extensive, especially that related to environmental information
(Campell, 2003; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Hackston and Milne,
1996). The industry is also used to identify differences in CSR
reporting, measured as the compliance with generally accepted
guidelines and standards for the preparation of SR (FernandezFeijoo et al., 2012; Morhardt, 2010; Reverte, 2009) In terms of frequency in publishing environmental reports, Kolk et al. (2001) and
Kolk (2003) use companies from the FG-250 and ﬁnd that those in
chemical and pharmaceutical industries lead the rankings. Palazzo
and Ricter (2005) analyze the inherent limitations in the tobacco
industry and how these circumstances affect their CSR communication strategy. Oil companies and those associated with environmental damage were found to provide higher levels of disclosure
(Alali and Romero, 2012; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Simnett et al.,
2009; KPMG, 2011). Similar results are reported by Jenkins and
Yakovleva (2006) for the mining sector.
With respect to the assurance of SR, Zorio et al. (2012) ﬁnd that
the industry determines the decision to assure the SR. Based on this
literature, we expect that the industry will inﬂuence the behavior in
CSR reporting related to frequency and assurance. Thus, our fourth
hypothesis is:
H4. There are differences in CSR behavior associated with
industries.
These four hypotheses provide information about the companies' characteristics, describing their behavior towards CSR,
based on their disclosure practices. The results may give some
managerial implications for strategic decisions related to CSR.
3. Research method
3.1. Sample and data collected
We use the GRI database as our main data source. Although
there are critics of this source, its comparability and the conceptual
approach used (Sherman, 2009; Skouloudis et al., 2009) makes the
GRI database extensible when used for research (Brown et al., 2009;
Alonso-Almeida et al., 2013; Sierra et al., 2013).
Data collected for our study refer to companies that issue CSR
reports registered in the GRI between 2008 and 2010 (data available on August, 24th 2011). During this period, the guidelines used
by companies were G2 (residual) and G3. The total number of CSR
reports registered in GRI for this period is presented in Table 1.
Our sample includes companies from 11 countries in North
America (United States), Europe (Sweden, Denmark, Norway,
Finland, Spain, Portugal, Germany), South America (Brazil) and Asia
(Japan, China). The intention is to work with the countries that have
a higher number of companies presenting SR. We also want to

Table 1
Total number of companies with CSR reports registered in GRI.
2008

Africa
Asia
Europe
Latin America
North America
Oceania
Total

2009

2010

Firms

%

Firms

%

Firms

%

51
187
512
142
154
72
1118

4.56%
16.73%
45.80%
12.70%
13.77%
6.44%
100.00%

56
308
687
191
183
91
1516

3.69%
20.32%
45.32%
12.60%
12.07%
6.00%
100.00%

54
370
839
266
250
83
1862

2.90%
19.87%
45.06%
14.29%
13.43%
4.46%
100.00%
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achieve a similar percentage of representation of the four
geographical areas more representative in the GRI database, from
countries with and without mandatory CSR reporting, in developed
and developing economies and with varying degrees of experience
in CSR reporting. Each observation of our sample is a company that
has registered its SR in GRI at least once for the three-year period.
Thus, we will have one observation for ﬁrm, independently of the
number of SR in GRI in the period 2008e2010. The number of ﬁrms
included in our sample is 1122.
The data collected from the GRI database is: Level of application,
Reporting frequency, Declaration of the level and Existence of an
assurance statement.
“Level of application” deﬁnes the extent of reporting according
to the GRI. G3, the standard most often used in the period analyzed,
deﬁnes three levels: A (more extensive), B (medium) and C (less
extensive). G2, the standard occasionally used, also establishes
three levels of application: In Accordance (high level); Content
Index (medium) and Reference Only (low level). Given the deﬁnition of these variables, it can be asserted that companies reporting
the highest levels of application (IA and A) provide more information than the ones reporting on the other two levels. We
compute the proportion of times in the three year period the
company reported in the higher level.
“Reporting frequency” measures the proportion of times each
company presented a report within the three periods of analysis.
“Declaration of the level” identiﬁes if the level of application is
certiﬁed by a third party, checked by GRI, or self-declared. The ﬁrst
two categories imply an external and independent veriﬁcation of
the level, adding credibility to the report. We compute the proportion of times the company externally certiﬁed the level of
application within the three years period.
Finally, “Existence of an assurance statement” indicates if the
proportion of times in the three year period the SR was assured.
We also collected other information from GRI database: Size,
Country and Industry.
3.2. Parameter deﬁnition
We deﬁne two groups of parameters. The ﬁrst group, “positional
factors”, includes a measure of the level of disclosure and its
credibility. It is used to position the participating companies in the
space of disclosure, represented in a double-axe graphic. The second group, “target variables”, presents the characteristics (ownership, size, country and industry) of the companies that are
positioned spatially according to their levels and quality of disclosure. Table 2 shows the two groups of parameters.
3.2.1. Positional factors
In order to test our hypotheses we identify the companies'
behavior classiﬁed as Novice (low disclosure, low credibility),
Cautious (low disclosure, high credibility), Chattering (high
disclosure, low credibility) and Leading (high disclosure, high
credibility), depending on the level of disclosure and credibility.
Each ﬁrm is by these means positioned on the double-axe
graphic. The two positional factors are Disclosure, which represents the attitude of the organization regarding the information
they want to communicate to their stakeholders, and Credibility,
which represents the conﬁdence given to the information
disclosure.
Disclosure cannot be measured directly, because it depends on
different factors. Level of application and Reporting frequency, are
proxy variables for public disclosure and disclosure intensity
(Bushman et al., 2004; Dubbink et al., 2008) and can be considered
as true determinants of the Disclosure factor (Perrini, 2005). Thus,
Level of application and Reporting frequency are the manifest

Table 2
Parameter deﬁnitions.
Parameter

Factors

Variables

Source

Positional factors Disclosure Level of application
Reporting frequency

Target variables

Calculated based on
GRI database
Calculated based on
GRI database
Credibility Declaration of the level
Calculated based on
Existence of AS for the SR GRI database
Calculated based on
GRI database
Each company and
Ownership
the national stock
Size
commissions
Country
GRI database
Industry
GRI database
GRI database

variables of Disclosure. The values of the manifest variables range
within 0 and 1. To group both variables into the represented
Disclosure construct, a factor analysis is carried out (Frias-Aceituno
et al., 2013; Jolliffe, 2002). The variable reduction proves to be
satisfactory (Cronbach's Alpha coefﬁcient, 0.742; Kaiser-Meyer,
0.500; Barlett (sig.), 88.525 (0.000)).
The second construct, Credibility, is measured using the same
procedure as Disclosure. The existence of AS and external certiﬁcations is considered a mechanism of credibility (Dando and Swift,
2003; Kaptein and Van Tulder, 2003; Williams, 2005). Thus,
Declaration of the level and the Existence of an Assurance statement are the manifest variables for Credibility. The result of a
factor analysis reduction is satisfactory (Cronbach's Alpha coefﬁcient, 0.795; Kaiser-Meyer, 0.500; Barlett (sig.), 649.743 (0.000)).
In sum, both Disclosure and Credibility, are calculated for each
company. The ﬁrst one reﬂects a quantitative aspect, the amount
of information reported; the second one represents a qualitative
aspect, the credibility or accuracy of the information disclosed. The
combination of both factors shows the commitment of the company to CSR.
3.2.2. Target variables
The four target variables are Ownership, Size, Country and Industry, based on Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2012). The ﬁrst variable
was obtained by a search of each company in the stock exchanges of
the different countries, while the last three variables were collected
from the GRI database, as mentioned in the previous section.
Ownership indicates if the company is listed in the stock market
or not (Monteiro and Aibar, 2010). This variable adopts a value of
0 if the company is not listed and 1 if it is. Of the companies of our
sample, 13.10% are private companies and 86.89% are stock marketlisted ﬁrms.
Size is based on the GRI classiﬁcation, which ranges companies
in three categories: 1, small- and medium-sized; 2, large-sized; and
3, multinational. In this paper, we transformed the variable into a
dichotomist one, which assumes a value of 1 if the company is a
large or multinational company and 0 otherwise. In our sample,
48.66% of the companies are small- and medium-sized, and 51.34%
are large or multinational.
Country represents a set of characteristics, such as culture,
economy, enforcement or existence of regulation on CSR reporting,
that inﬂuence both the disclosure and the credibility of the
reporting. We work with 11 countries covering a wide global
geographical area (Table 3).
Industry is a variable extensively recognized as a sensitive variable for CSR reporting Morhardt et al., 2010; Simnett et al., 2009).
We used the GRI classiﬁcation that deﬁnes 38 industries.
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Table 4
Analysis of the means.

Country

Area

N

United States of America
Denmark
Finland
Germany
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Brazil
Japan
China
Total

North America
Europe
Europe
Europe
Europe
Europe
Europe
Europe
South America
Asia
Asia

242
15
36
88
19
40
229
92
160
126
75
1122

3.3. Methodology
For each target variable, namely Ownership, Size, Country and
Industry, we calculate the mean value of the Disclosure and Credibility factors for each category. For example, for Ownership, given
that it assumes two values (0 if the company is not listed and 1 if it
is), we calculate the mean Disclosure and Credibility for companies
listed and not listed. These results are positioned in a double-axe
graph (Disclosure in the Y-axis and Credibility in the X-axis) to
represent the CSR reporting behavior (Novice, Cautious, Chattering
and Leading) for each group. We repeat the same procedure for
Size, Country and Industry.
The test of hypotheses is developed in two steps. In the ﬁrst one
we conﬁrm the validity of using the mean values. In the second one,
we conduct four positional analyses. In each of these analyses we
test the different groups of the target variables (Ownership, Size,
Country and Industry), to evaluate the companies' level of
commitment to CSR. In order to graph the representation of the two
positional factors, Disclosure and Credibility, we identify two levels
of the variable, high and low. This setting deﬁnes the four possible
behaviors in our model: Novice, Cautious, Chattering and Leading.
In order to identify any underlying relationship among the four
target variables, we conduct an exploratory analysis using crosstabs
and hierarchical loglinear tests (Garson, 2012). The outcome of this
analysis shows the possible associations among the target variables
and helps in the interpretation of the results.
4. Results
We start by running several tests to validate the use of the
means for the inference of our results. For this purpose, the data
collected are grouped based on the four target variables used:
Ownership, Size, Country and Industry. We conduct nonparametric
tests because the KolmogoroveSmirnov and ShapiroeWilk tests
indicate a lack of normality of the data and usual mathematical
transformations such as logarithms do not deal Normal distribution
samples. The results presented in Table 4 show that there are statistically signiﬁcant differences between groups except for size in
terms of credibility.
We then use hierarchical log-linear analysis for exploratory
model to analyze the associations of each of the values of a target
variable in relation to the values of the other target variable. The
results identify interactions of order 2 and the main effects that are
signiﬁcant (p-values 0.000). We ﬁnd signiﬁcant associations in
Country and Ownership, Country and Size, Industry and Ownership
and Ownership and Size (Asymp. Sig. 2-sided ¼ 0.000). Country and
Industry as well as Industry and Size cannot be explained because
more than 20% of the cells have an expected count less than 5. The
Chi-Square goodness of ﬁt test indicates that our model is adequate

Dependent variables

Independent variables

Disclosure

Ownership
Size
Ownership
Size
Independent variables

Credibility
Dependent variables
Disclosure

Country
Industry
Country
Industry

Credibility

Means
Mann Whitney
Asymp. Sig. (2-Tailed)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.218
KruskaleWallis test
Asymp. Sig.
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

(p-value ¼ 0.000). The value of the estimated parameters and their
signiﬁcance show that non-listed companies are more likely in
Sweden, Spain (signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level), Portugal
and Brazil (signiﬁcant at the 95% level); SMEs are more likely in
Spain (signiﬁcant at the 95% level); and SMEs size and private
ownership are fully associated. Regarding industry, listed companies are more likely to belong to the following industries:
Automotive, Aviation, Chemicals, Computers, Consumer Durables,
Energy, Energy Utilities, Healthcare Products, Household and Personal Products, Metals Products, Technology Hardware and Telecommunications. All industries have a signiﬁcant association at the
99% conﬁdence level, except for aviation, Computers and Metal
Products, which have an association at the 95% level. Results are
interpreted taking into account these associations.
Finally, to tests the hypotheses we represent graphically each
target variable on the aforementioned four-quadrant diagram.
Hypothesis 1. Ownership
Fig. 1 presents the position of the target variable Ownership in a
double-axis chart. Values are presented in Annex 1.
Companies listed in the stock market disclose more information
than non-listed companies. This effect can be related to its public
visibility, which is consistent with previous research on corporate
governance, and it may also be related to requirements of the
respective exchange commissions. However, companies listed in
the stock market present their reports with a lower level of credibility than private ones. This is an interesting and novel result
because most of the research on the topic is based exclusively on
data from listed companies. Stock market-listed ownership seems
to be associated with a Chattering attitude towards CSR, while nonlisted ownership seems to be linked to a Cautious behavior in CSR.
Our ﬁndings support Hypothesis 1.
Ownership
0.15

Listed companies

0.1

0.05

Disclosure

Table 3
Sample description. Countries and number of companies per country.
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0
-0.2

-0.15

-0.1

-0.05

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

-0.05

-0.1

-0.15

Credibility

Fig. 1. Ownership variable.

Non-listed
companies

0.2
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Hypothesis 2. Size
Following our analysis with the second target variable, Fig. 2
presents the position of Size in a double-axis chart. The mean
values are presented in Annex 2.
Similar to the results of companies listed in the stock market
reported by Simnett et al. (2009), small- and medium-sized enterprises disclose less than large and multinational companies do.
Regarding credibility, our sample shows that small- and mediumsized companies add more credibility to their reports than large
and multinational companies do. The comparison indicates that the
behavior of small companies is similar to that of non-listed ones,
which is reasonable given that small companies are usually nonlisted. Large companies, on the contrary, present lower levels of
disclosure than stock market-listed ones. It seems that there is an
increase in reporting by large companies produced by the requirements of the exchange commissions or the external investors.
Large companies also present higher levels of credibility than listed
companies. Hypothesis 2 is also supported.
Hypothesis 3. Country
The third target variable, Country, is represented in Fig. 3, and its
values are shown in Annex 3.
Countries are identiﬁed with three of the four deﬁned behaviors, excluding the Chattering behavior. Our results identify a
group of countries with high levels of disclosure and credibility
(Leading), represented by Spain and Portugal. The group with the
lowest level of reporting and credibility (Novice) is represented by
Japan, China, the United States and Brazil. Finally, there is an intermediate group represented by northern European countries
(Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Germany) with similar
positional variables (Cautious). Although Denmark is marginally
included in the higher-level group, cultural characteristics align it
more closely with northern European countries. Countries from
the European Union (EU) have a more responsible behavior, which
can be linked to the European policy on CSR. Hypothesis 3 is
supported.
Hypothesis 4. Industry
Target variable four, Industry, is presented in Fig. 4, and its mean
values are presented in Annex 4. There are differences in CSR
behavior associated with industry that support Hypothesis 4.
The industries presented in Fig. 4 are included in Table 5. The
low-level reporting and credibility group (Novice) has the largest
number of participating industries (15), representing 37% of the
companies. The high-level reporting and credibility group (Leading) includes 10 industries (32% of the companies). The Chattering
group is the smallest one, both in number of industries, 6, and
percentage, 15%. Finally, the Cautious group has 7 industries, representing a 16% of the companies.

Fig. 3. Country variable.

There is quite a signiﬁcant concentration around the axes’
crossing point. Thus, the evolution of these industries over time is
expected and should be analyzed. Most of the industries in the
Leading group are generally recognized to be committed with CSR,
such as Water utilities or Energy industries (Araya, 2006; Alali and
Romero, 2012; Gamerschlag et al., 2011), while the Novice group
includes industries that are not referenced by the literature, such as
the Tobacco industry, according to Palazzo and Richter (2005).
Table 5 summarizes the results of the level of commitment to
CSR of the companies in our sample.
5. Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed behavior towards CSR based on
companies' CSR reporting. We deﬁned four categories of behavior
based on two reporting variables, Disclosure and Credibility, and
studied the effect of Ownership, Size, Country and Industry on CSR
behavior. This analysis allowed us to assess the level of commitment of those groups in terms of CSR.
The proposed hypotheses are supported, while at the same time,
they allow us to draw some interesting conclusions. Regarding the
target variable Ownership, most of the previous literature addresses companies listed in the stock market due to data

Industry
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D isclosure
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Disclosure
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20
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37
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34
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Fig. 2. Size variable.
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Fig. 4. Industry variable.
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Table 5
Results.
Value
Variable
Ownership
Size
Countries
Industries

Novice
Low credibility
Low disclosure

Brazil, China, Japan, the United States
Agriculture, Chemicals, Consumer Durables,
Equipment, Food and Beverage Products,
Forest and Paper Products, Healthcare
Products, Media, Non-Proﬁt/Services,
Other (*), Technology Hardware, Textiles
and Apparel, Tobacco, Toys, Universities

Chattering
Low credibility
High disclosure

Cautious
High credibility
Low disclosure

Stock market-listed ﬁrms
Large and multinational

Not stock market-listed ﬁrms
Small and medium
Germany, Sweden, (Finland) (Norway)
Aviation, Commercial Services,
Conglomerates (*), Healthcare Services,
Public Agencies (*), Real Estate,
Tourism/Leisure

Automotive, Computers,
Construction Materials, Energy,
Household/Personal Products,
Metal Products

Leading
High credibility
High disclosure

Denmark, Portugal, Spain
Construction, Energy Utilities,
Financial Services, Logistics,
Mining, Railroad, Retailers,
Telecommunications, Waste
Management, Water Utilities

Other, Conglomerates and Public Agencies, marked with an (*), are a set of companies grouped without a sectorial criterion and are therefore excluded from the analysis.

availability. Our results show that listed companies disclose more
CSR information but with less credibility than private companies
do. It seems that owner-managed companies disclose less CSR information than those managed by professionals (Chau and Gray,
2002; Eng and Mak, 2003). To the best of our knowledge, this
result is an original contribution to literature. Because owners
participate more in the management of private companies, less
managerial-owner control is required, which allows owners to
focus on non-investor stakeholders, such as the community or their
employees. These non-investor stakeholders need additional
guaranties to trust SR. On the contrary, listed ﬁrms have investors
as their main stakeholders, who are given trust in terms of the
companies' ﬁnancial disclosures. In sum, stock market-listed ﬁrms
are more likely to have a Chattering behavior, while non-listed
ﬁrms are more likely to have a Cautious attitude.
Regarding Size, our results conﬁrm previous research ﬁndings
that the larger the ﬁrm, the more it discloses (Brammer and Pavelin,
2006; Simnett et al., 2009). Additionally, in our sample, small
companies add more credibility to their reports. This result is linked
to the deﬁnition of Small- and medium-sized companies given that
most of the literature on this topic is based on empirical analysis
performed with listed companies. In many cases, the classiﬁcation
of a company as small or large is actually a classiﬁcation between
large and larger companies, with all of them being large or multinational companies. In this paper, we work with a sample of 147
real small- and medium-sized companies. We observe that large or
multinational ﬁrms are more likely to have a Chattering behavior,
while small- and medium-sized ﬁrms are more likely to have a
Cautious one. The agreement in the behavior between stock
market-listed and large companies and private and small companies is supported and coherent.
The effects of both Ownership and Size have to be interpreted
considering the association between both variables. These variables
are highly associated and, as it is above mentioned, Ownership and
Size offer similar results. What it is interesting in our results is that
we analyze real small-and-medium sized companies and conclude
on their less but more reliable disclosing, meaning that a cautious
behavior towards CSR.
Similar to those of Van der Lann Smith et al. (2005) and Kolk
and Perego (2010), our results conﬁrm that companies in
stakeholder-oriented countries (Spain, Portugal or Denmark)
disclose more CSR information and are more likely to present
assurance of SR than companies in shareholder-oriented countries
such as the USA. European countries lead the rankings in the
disclosure of CSR information, and they tend to possess a Cautious
or Leading attitude. The results reﬂect the last two decades of
efforts by the European Union, which has driven the development
of regulations among member states, resulting in different models
of CSR reporting. Our study shows similar behavior for central and

northern European countries and southern European countries,
namely Portugal and Spain, where the latter offer a more
responsible pattern. Estimated association parameters show that
non-listed companies are more likely in Sweden, Spain, Portugal
and Brazil. SMEs are more likely in Spain. Regarding Portugal and
Spain, as ﬁrms are more likely to be non-listed and SME, Credibility may be promoted by Ownership or Size variable, in some
extent. The association between Ownership and Brazil seems to be
not strong enough to inﬂuence the behavior of companies in this
country. Sweden follows the non-listed expected behavior. All of
the countries classiﬁed in the Novice behavior group are nonEuropean. This group represents important worldwide economies without a common link. Similar results are reported by Kolk
(2008) and Hartman et al. (2007). Cultural differences or public
policies may explain this classiﬁcation, which opens an investigation route for future research.
Our results offer a proposal to classify industry behavior. The
group of industries that show a behavior categorized as Leading
more or less coincides with industries found to have higher levels of
disclosure and more environmental sensitivity. The effect of environmental legislation must also be considered (Barratt, 2006). In
the Novice behavior group, we identify two groups of industries.
The ﬁrst one has a close proximity to consumers (Consumer Durables, Equipment, Food and Beverage Products, Healthcare Products, Media, Textiles and Apparel, Tobacco, Toys, Universities, NonProﬁt/Services, Technology Hardware). The second one includes
three industries that can be considered to be environmentally
sensitive (Agriculture, Chemicals, Forest and Paper Products).
Chattering behavior is followed by industries with an industrial
proﬁle. Finally, Cautious behavior is recognized in a set of industries
for which we have not found a common link. Results for industry
have to consider possible associations with the other target variables. In fact, listed companies are more likely to belong to the
following industries: Automotive, Aviation, Chemicals, Computers,
Consumer Durables, Energy, Energy Utilities, Healthcare Products,
Household and Personal Products, Metals Products, Technology
Hardware and Telecommunications. 5 over 12 associations correspond to industries classiﬁed as chattering (Automotive, Computers, Energy, Household and Personal Products and Metals
Products), the same as for listed companies. Interactions between
these industries and Ownership variable may inﬂuence and tend
these sectors to lower values of credibility. On the other hand, only
one industry (Aviation) is classiﬁed as cautious, the same as nonlisted companies. Thus, we can conclude on the strength of this
classiﬁcation.
Based on our results, we can recommend to large companies to
give more credibility to their SR as a way to found solid communication with their stakeholders. A similar recommendation can be
made for companies listed in the stock market. These two groups
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have more ﬁnancial resources for sustainability reporting, but they
lack credibility and should give more conﬁdence to their stakeholders through AS. On the other hand, the effect of cultural factors
on a country's behavior is observed. To some extent, country
legislation could be a tool with which to compensate differences
among countries. Regarding Industry, our results can offer a wellbased classiﬁcation criterion due the difﬁculty of deﬁning consistent groups for this variable.
The never-ending debate over mandatory reporting can also be
enriched by our contribution. It is not only the obligation to elaborate and present SR but also its necessity that could be legally
supported to give credibility to reports by means of AS. In our
opinion, the debate should be extended by considering the need for
an external assurance of SR, as it is for ﬁnancial reporting.
In sum, our outcomes offer some interesting contributions to
literature regarding non-listed companies and their reporting
behavior and conﬁrm previous research about the effect of the
country on disclosing attitudes. We also present a new classiﬁcation for the variable Industry, based on their reporting proﬁle. We
complete our contribution with some recommendations to the
managers of national and multinational companies when preparing
corporate social disclosure by providing practical thinking about
their communication tool with stakeholders.
We are aware of the limitations of our paper due analysis performed, even though we have included the possible associations
among the target variables as a complementary explanation of our
results. The use of the GRI as our only data source can be considered
as an additional limitation, as Marimon et al. (2012) indicate.
Delmas et al. (2013) suggest that for environmental and social
performance, more than one information provider should be
considered. The analysis of only eleven countries can also be
regarded as a limitation. Future research should focus on the
application of the methodology to a wider sample using additional
information sources. It would also be interesting to analyze the
time trend of the position of each target variable, namely, Ownership, Size, Country and Industry. For example, in Industry, there is
an important concentration around axes, and it would be interesting to observe the evolution to date and the direction of the
future changes in strategy if they exist.

Annex 1

Ownership means

Credibility

Disclosure

0 e Non-listed ownership
1 e Stock market listed ownership
Average

0.178129853
0.168844219
0.000004127

0.120126044
0.113868108
0.000000704

Annex 2

Size means

Credibility

Disclosure

0 - Small and medium
1 e Large and multinational
Average

0.063201293
0.009524062
0.000004127

0.401839388
0.060584205
0.000000704

Annex 3

Country means

Credibility

Disclosure

1 e United States
2 e Sweden
3 e Denmark
4 e Norway
5 e Finland
6 e Spain
7 e Portugal
8 e Germany
9 e Brazil
10 e Japan
11 e China
Average

0.454179959
0.509154891
0.428408000
0.122393158
0.063015556
0.666790480
0.635751250
0.154651250
0.138944375
0.666653175
0.446016000
0.000004127

0.246950826
0.125811522
0.068828000
0.004052632
0.011850278
0.543656725
0.376092500
0.149760795
0.117255625
0.103470952
0.316756533
0.000000704

Annex 4

Industry means

Credibility

Disclosure

1 e Agriculture
2 e Automotive
3 e Aviation
4 e Chemicals
5 e Commercial services
6 e Computers
7 e Conglomerates
8 e Construction
9 e Construction materials
10 e Consumer durables
11 e Energy
12 e Energy utilities
13 e Equipment
14 e Financial services
15 e Food and beverage products
16 e Forest and paper products
17 e Healthcare products
18 e Healthcare services
19 e Household and personal products
20 e Logistics
21 e Media
22 e Metal products
23 e Mining
24 e Non-proﬁt/Services
25 e Other
26 e Public agencies
27 e Railroad
28 e Real Estate
29 e Retailers
30 e Technology hardware
31 e Telecommunications
32 e Textiles and apparel
33 e Tobacco
34 e Tourism/Leisure
35 e Toys
36 e Universities
37 e Waste management
38 e Water utilities
Average

0.588825455
0.261603158
0.119274762
0.408650625
0.050679355
0.109388571
0.205799091
0.130865000
0.160960000
0.422711935
0.112047600
0.140224444
0.449926364
0.363890000
0.113177302
0.055297273
0.283807037
0.227001667
0.564587059
0.036922667
0.065453333
0.233382963
0.439288235
0.034407500
0.089071000
0.330700000
0.371680000
0.178963200
0.136825000
0.488287714
0.230107200
0.091649375
0.804240000
0.222363333
0.804240000
0.283780769
0.311998000
0.691653571
0.000004127

0.643688182
0.173888421
0.035680000
0.068711250
0.340031290
0.105271429
0.017108182
0.454047500
0.059581053
0.127326774
0.203585867
0.539564603
0.333586818
0.336380000
0.331511111
0.110263939
0.152782222
0.131512778
0.100473529
0.084874333
0.082379167
0.078497037
0.084535294
0.551555000
0.228361000
0.065213200
0.261680000
0.319562400
0.026280455
0.075896000
0.465160800
0.173245000
0.594735000
0.625376667
0.248810000
0.643563077
0.208391000
0.247925714
0.000000704
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